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"An idea, like a ghost, according to the common notion of ghosts,
must be spoken to a little before it will explain itself."1
I. INTRODUCTION
Copyright does not protect the ideas contained in a work, but
only the way in which those ideas are expressed.2 A playwright can-
not obtain exclusive rights to the idea of feuding Irish-Catholic and
* Leslie A. Kurtz, Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. The author wishes
to thank her research assistant, Paolo M. Dau, for his help in the preparation of this Article.
1. Robert Y. Libott, Round the Prickly Pear: The Idea-Expression Fallacy in a Mass
Communications World, 14 UCLA L. REV. 735, 737 (1967) (quoting unknown source,
reprinted in EDWARDS, NEW DICTIONARY OF THOUGHTS 271 (1944)).
2. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting
Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1983); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977); Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162
F.2d 354, 363 (9th Cir. 1947); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir.
1930); Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 691 (2d Cir. 1926). This principle, which developed in
case law, has now been codified in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1990): "In no case does copyright
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Jewish families whose children marry and produce grandchildren.'
Nor will copyright give an artist the exclusive right to paint two
cardinals on the branches of a blossoming apple tree.4 As Justice
Brandeis said, "the noblest of human productions-knowledge, truths
ascertained, conceptions, and ideas-become, after voluntary commu-
nication to others, free as the air to common use."5
This distinction between unprotected idea and protected expres-
sion, often called the idea/expression dichotomy, is one of the central
tenets of copyright law. However, the words idea and expression
remain strangely undefined, terms without content, bottles without
wine.6 One cannot coordinate all things called idea, compare them
with those called expression, and draw even the fuzziest of lines
between them. The terms are used impressionistically, to justify a
result rather than to provide a reason for reaching it.7 They are man-
tras recited to give a result the imprimatur of law. The idea/expres-
sion dichotomy does, however, serve an important purpose. It leaves
those things termed "ideas" unprotected, which means that they may
be used, or indeed copied, by others. It mitigates the rigors of "what
might otherwise be an overreaching monopolistic control by the copy-
right owner, thus promoting society's interest in enriching the public
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea... regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."
3. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 119.
4. Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exch., Inc., 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
5. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in XIII
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 333-34 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903):
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive
property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an
individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the
moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every one, and the
receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no one
possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives
an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.
6. Professor Goldstein suggests that " 'idea' and 'expression' should not be taken literally,
but rather as metaphors for a work's unprotected and protected elements." I PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, § 2.3.1. (1989). See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner
Corp., 214 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) ("[N]o principle can be stated as to when an imitator
has gone beyond copying the 'idea' and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must
therefore: inevitably be ad hoc.").
7. See Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN. L.
REV. 321, 324 (1989).
8. Protecting ideas under copyright might create constitutional problems, as it would
undercut the First Amendment interest in the free exchange of ideas. Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555-60 (1985).
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domain."9
The primary purpose of copyright is to promote creativity and
disseminate creative works, so that the public may benefit from the
labor of authors."0 Copyright provides authors with an incentive to
create by giving them the exclusive rights to profit from and control
certain specified uses of their works.' 1 However, this incentive is not
without costs. An incentive for one author provides a barrier to
others. The exclusive rights granted by copyright diminish the ability
of new authors to make use of what has come before in creating their
own works. "The more extensive copyright protection is, the more
inhibited is the literary imagination."' 2
All authors build on the work of their predecessors. The process
of creation necessarily reshapes what already exists in the world.
Authors do not create out of some inner void, "unaided and unin-
structed by the thoughts of others."" We live and work within our
culture, and the language and symbols that inhabit it. We draw suste-
nance and understanding from all that surrounds us, and use what we
experience, including the creative works of others. The idea/expres-
sion dichotomy helps copyright strike a productive balance between
providing incentives to create and protecting the public domain from
being stripped of the raw materials needed for new creations. 4
9. Robert A. Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyright, 29 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y 560, 560-61 (1982); see Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L. J. 965, 992
(1990) ("Courts invoked the public domain when the breadth of plaintiffs' asserted property
rights threatened, as a practical matter, to prevent many other authors from pursuing their
craft.").
10. See ALAN LATMAN ET AL., COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 12-15 (3d ed. 1989)
(quoting REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE
U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 3-6) (1961)).
11. These exclusive rights are, with limitations, reproduction, distribution, performance,
display, and the preparation of derivative works. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
12. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 348 (1988). See White v. Samsung
Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from the order
rejecting the suggestion for rehearing en banc) ("Culture, like science and technology, grows
by accretion, each new creator building on the works of those who came before.
Overprotection stifles the very creative forces it's supposed to nurture.").
13. Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C. D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436); see POSNER,
supra note 12, at 348 ("The literary imagination is not a volcano of pure inspiration but a
weaving of the author's experience of life into an existing literary tradition."); Litman, supra
note 9, at 966-67 (Authorship is "more akin to translation and recombination than it is to
creating Aphrodite from the foam of the sea .... [Authors] all engage in the process of
adapting, transforming, and recombining what is already 'out there' in some other form. This
is not parasitism: it is the essence of authorship.").
14. See Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 140 n.6 (1785) (Lord Mansfield), quoted in
Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 n.27 (3d Cir. 1986)
("[W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of
ability, who have employed their time for the service of the community, may not be deprived
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If an author, by originating a new arrangement and form of expres-
sion of certain ideas or conceptions, could withdraw these ideas or
conceptions from the stock of materials to be used by other
authors, each copyright would narrow the field of thought open for
development and exploitation, and science, poetry, narrative, and
dramatic action and other branches of literature would be hindered
by copyright, instead of being promoted. 5
Thus, elements called ideas should be left unprotected in order to
avoid unduly inhibiting the independent creations of others.
The distinction helps draw an economic balance as well. Copy-
right protection may provide incentives for creation and investment in
creation.' 6 However, it undermines competition, which ordinarily
makes markets efficient,' 7 and renders the creation of new works more
costly. Protecting ideas, in particular, might increase the cost of cre-
ating works and reduce the number of works created. An author
would be required either to design around the ideas already expressed
by earlier authors or incur increased licensing costs in order to obtain
the right to use them.'8 Authors use "scraps of thought from
thousands of predecessors, far too many to compensate even if the
legal system were frictionless, which it isn't."'19 They should be free
to use the basic building blocks of creation without having to locate
and bargain with earlier authors. Furthermore, all authors are bor-
rowers as well as lenders of ideas. Because creating an idea that is
embedded in a copyrighted work ordinarily costs less than creating
the work itself, authors, hiding "behind a veil of ignorance," might
of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world may
not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded.").
15. Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
16. It is difficult to determine how much protection is needed to induce the optimal flow of
creative works. See Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for
Principled Standards, 70 MINN. L. REV. 579, 596 (1985). There are other incentives to
creation, such as prestige, prizes and patronage, and publishers continue to make money
publishing HAMLET. Id. Other motives include fame or recognition among their peers, the
desire to promulgate their views, or a need to create that is an integral part of their
personalities. Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532,
1574.
17. lrown, supra note 16, at 604.
18. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18
J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 348 (1989). Landes and Posner hypothesize that each of N works
express the same idea differently. Each might be a romance between those of different social
classes or religious faiths whose parents are feuding. "If copyright protected the first author's
idea, the cost of expression to each of the remaining N-1 authors would increase, because each
would have to invest time and effort in coming up with an original idea for his work, or to
substitute additional expression for the part of his idea that overlapped the first author's, or to
incur licensing and other transaction costs to obtain the right to use the first author's idea."
Id.
19. Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990).
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well agree to a rule that protects expression but not ideas.2°
Thus, the distinction between idea and expression serves an
important purpose, but the meanings of protected expression and
unprotected idea are unclear.21 Copyright is not limited to prohibit-
ing literal copying-taking the words, sounds, colors, lines used by an
author.2 2 Therefore, protectible expression must comprehend more
than those literal elements. But if the distinction between idea and
expression does not lie between the form of a work and its content,
where does it lie? Ideas are difficult to explain and define. Like Ham-
let, they will not have the heart plucked out of their mystery.2 a We
may not be able to grasp them firmly in our hands. But perhaps, if we
speak with them a little, they will explain themselves. This article
does not run a straight course from beginning to end. It hunts; and
in the hunting, it sometimes worries the same raccoon in different
trees, or different raccoons in the same tree, or even what turns out
to be no raccoon in any tree. It finds itself balking more than once
at the same barrier and taking off on other trails. It drinks often
from the same streams, and stumbles over some cruel country.
And it counts not the kill but what is learned of the territory
explored.24
Sections II and III consider the scope of copyright, the proper
context for discussing the idea/expression dichotomy. Section II
deals with the consequences of extending copyright protection beyond
verbatim copying and the relationship between form and meaning.
Section III analyzes the way in which the scope of copyright protec-
tion and infringement interact, and the effect this has on the idea/
expression distinction. Section IV circles around the notion of an
idea, and its distinction from expression, seeking for context and
meaning. Finally, section V considers some symptoms of unprotected
ideas-symptoms that are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions
for the existence of an unprotectible idea, but tend, in conjunction
with other such symptoms, to be present.25
20. Landes & Posner, supra note 18, at 348-49.
21. See Libott, supra note 1, at 738. Libott notes that words such as "theme" or "plot"
are appended to idea to show what sort of writings are beyond the pale of copyright protection,
but this says nothing about the nature of an idea. Id. at 739. Furthermore, other cases, in
other contexts, have protected themes and plots. Id.
22. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
23. "You would play upon me, you would seem to know my stops, you would pluck out
the heart of my mystery, you would sound me from my lowest note to the top of my
compass-and there is much music, excellent voice, in this little organ-yet cannot you make
it speak... Call me what instrument you will, though you can fret me, you cannot play upon
me." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act III, sc. 2, 367-75 (G.B. Harrison ed., 1962).
24. NELSON GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING ix (1978).
25. See NELSON GOODMAN, LANGUAGES OF ART 252 (1968) (symptoms of the aesthetic).
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II. SCOPE OF PROTECTION-FORM AND CONTENT
If copyright protected only against literal copying, the distinction
between protected expression and unprotected ideas would present
few problems. The line could be drawn between the form in which
the author expressed her ideas and the content of those ideas. Indeed,
copyright initially protected a work against literal copying only;
abridgements, translations and dramatizations did not infringe an
author's copyright.26 Works adopted from "page to stage" infringed
only if the dramatist made abundant use of the exact language from
the original book.
27
Stowe v. Thomas28 provides an example of the way in which
courts approached these cases. The plaintiff, Harriet Beecher Stowe,
was the author of the very successful 29 and influential3 novel, Uncle
Tom's Cabin. The court held that an unauthorized German transla-
tion of the complete text of the novel did not infringe Stowe's copy-
right. 31 The court concluded:
By the publication of Mrs. Stowe's book, the creations of the
genius and imagination of the author have become as much public
property as those of Homer or Cervantes.... All her conceptions
and inventions may be used and abused by imitators, play-rights,
and poetasters .... All that now remains is the copyright of her
book; the exclusive right to print, reprint and vend it .... A trans-
lation may, in loose phraseology, be called a transcript or copy of
her thoughts or conceptions, but in no correct sense can it be called
a copy of her book.
3 2
26. Charles B. Collins, Some Obsolescent Doctrines of the Law of Copyright, I S.C. L. REV.
127, 127 (1928); see BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 1-32 (1967);
Libott, supra note 1, at 743-44.
27. Libott, supra note 1, at 744.
28. 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514).
29. The book, published in 1852, sold 300,000 copies in the United States within the first
year, and over one million copies in its London publication. George L. Aiken, Uncle Tom's
Cabin: .ntroduction, in DRAMAS FROM THE AMERICAN THEATRE 1762-1909 350 (Richard
Moody ,.d., 1966).
30. Lincoln reportedly said to Stowe, "So you're the little woman who wrote the book that
made this great war!" Id. at 351.
31. Stowe, 23 F. Cas. at 208.
32. Id. Numerous dramatizations of the novel were also created and performed, without
authorization, and Ms. Stowe never received a penny in royalties. Aiken, supra note 29, at
349-50. Shortly after publication of the novel, Asa Hutchinson, a popular temperance singer,
asked permission to dramatize the play. Ms. Stowe replied:
It is thought, with the present state of theatrical performances in this country,
that any attempt on the part of Christians to identify themselves with them will
be productive of danger to the individual character, and to the general cause. If
the barrier which now keeps young people of Christian families from theatrical
entertainments is once broken down by the introduction of respectable and moral
plays, they will then be open to all the temptations of those who are not such, as
1226
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A copyright gave an author the right "to that arrangement of
words which the author has selected to express his ideas."' a3 The
court in Stowe focused on the question of whether an allegedly
infringing work had been literally copied or independently created,
and whether any copying had been substantial enough to be consid-
ered infringing. An author of a literary work was only protected
against the taking of her language. Everything else could be termed
ideas, sentiments, conceptions, or thoughts and left undefined and
unprotected.
Over the years, however, the scope of copyright protection
greatly expanded, progressively providing more extensive rights.
Copyright is no longer restricted to protecting against verbatim or
near verbatim copying. 34 Appropriating the action of a play or novel,
for example, may be infringing, even if none of the words are taken. 5
Although one who copies the basic plot or theme of a work will be
taking only an unprotected idea, copying the patterning and arrange-
ment of events and the interplay of characters is an actionable taking
of expression. 6 In what has become known as the "abstractions"
test, Judge Learned Hand said:
Upon any work ... a great number of patterns of increasing gener-
ality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left
out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general state-
ment of what the [work] is about, and at times might consist only
of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where
there will be, as the world now is, five bad plays to one good .... The world is not
good enough yet for it to succeed.
Id. at 350.
33. Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86 (1899).
34. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (protection
"cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial
variations").
35. Frankel v. Irwin, 34 F.2d 142, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1918). One author suggests that the
change in conception among authors as to what constitutes literary property, which made its
way into the law, was the result of
the substitution of the canons of romantacism for those of classicism as the
criteria of literature. Classicism assumed that literary excellence had some
relation to scholarship-that inborn genius could not result in literature except in
conjunction with learning and culture .... Romantacism went to the opposite
extreme. Scholarship, it maintained, could never result in the production of
great literature. The test of genius was originality and only the complete
ignoramus could be completely original.
Kenneth B. Umbreit, A Consideration of Copyright, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 932, 947-48. But see
Libott, supra note 1, at 744-45 (suggesting that the expansion of literary property was due to
the market for secondary and derivative uses of literary works, which expanded along with the
Industrial Revolution).
36. See Zechariah Chafee, Reflections on Copyright Law: I, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 513-
14 (1945).
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they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could
prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from their expres-
sion,, his property is never extended. Nobody has ever been able to
fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.37
Once copyright began protecting against non-literal copying, the
idea/expression dichotomy became more important. Because any
taking or use of elements from a copyrighted work might be consid-
ered an infringement, a device was needed to limit potential liability.
Copyright's refusal to protect what is termed "idea" limits the uses of
elements from a copyrighted work that will be considered infringing.
Otherwise, later creators would be unduly restricted as they sought to
build on the work of others, to make use of what already exists in the
culture. Too strict a limitation on the borrowing of non-literal ele-
ments could stifle independent creation.3
The extension of copyright protection beyond verbatim copying,
however, not only made the distinction between ideas and expression
more important, it also made it more difficult to characterize.
Because: copyright protection is not limited to the literal aspects of a
work, lhability may exist for taking content without form. But the
form of a work cannot be cleanly separated from its content; the way
something is said cannot be neatly detached from what is said.
Changing the words used in a literary work may change the signifi-
cance or feeling of what is said. Similarly, a slight alteration in color
or shape may affect a painting's aesthetic qualities. Nelson Goodman
has noted that when something is said, some aspects of the way it is
said may be considered issues of style; content remains constant
although the form has changed.39 But each different way of saying
something may amount to the saying of a different thing.4 Synon-
37. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). In what has been
called the "patterns" test, Professor Chafee also sought to distinguish protectible expression
from unprotectible ideas:
[I]i" we protect more than precise words, where shall we stop? The line is
sometimes drawn between an idea and its expression. This does not solve the
problem, because "expression" has too wide a range. To some extent, the
expression of an abstract idea should be free for use by others. No doubt, the line
does lie somewhere between the author's idea and the precise form in which he
wrote it down. I like to say that the protection covers the "pattern" of the
work. . . . the sequence of events and the development of the interplay of
characters.
Chafee, supra note 36, at 513-14.
38. mi. at 513.
39. GOODMAN, supra note 24, at 24.
40. Id.
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ymy4 1 is suspect, and no two terms are likely to have exactly the same
42meaning.
Keats wrote
0, for a draught of vintage! that hath been
Cool'd a long age in the deep-delved earth
43
William Alston offers a paraphrase of those lines:
Oh, for a drink of wine that has been reduced in temperature over
a long period in ground with deep furrows in it.4"
The words are very different. At first glance, the meaning seems very
similar.45 However, there are major differences. The words in Keats'
lines are evocative. "Draught," "vintage," "cooled", and "earth"
have connotations that go beyond the explicit meanings of the words.
Keats conveys the excellence of the wine, the care and time that went
into its production, and the delight that drinking it is expected to
give.46 The two pieces of writing do not say the same thing.
A similar problem in sorting meaning from form can be found in
41. "Perfectly synonymous words would be ...intersubstitutable in every sentence."
WILLIAM P. ALSTON, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 44 (1964).
42. Id. at 45.
43. John Keats, Ode to a Nightingale, in JOHN KEATS COMPLETE POEMS AND SELECTED
LETrERS 349, 349 (Clarence D. Thorpe ed., 1935).
44. ALSTON, supra note 41, at 45.
45. Indeed, while conceding that the word "earth" has special associations lacking in the
word "ground," such as earth mother, fertility, earthy qualities in people, Alston states: "I
cannot see that in saying 'It came from the earth' I am taking responsibility for any condition
over and above those for which I am taking responsibility in saying 'It came out of the
ground.'" He thus concludes that ground and earth have the same meanings. Id. at 46.
Monroe Beardsley disagrees, saying first that if the meaning of each word is its total
illocutionary-act potential, earth and ground do differ in meaning; there are many
illocutionary acts that can be performed with the help of one that will fail if the other is
substituted. For example, ground mother cannot be substituted for earth mother. Monroe C.
Beardsley, The Testability of an Interpretation, in PHILOSOPHY LOOKS AT THE ARTS 477
(Joseph Z. Margolis ed., 3d ed. 1978). He also concludes that the two words have different
meanings in context. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
An illocutionary act is what is accomplished in or by uttering a sentence. "The minimal
units of human communication are speech acts of a type called illocutionary acts. Some
examples of these are statements, questions, commands, promises, and apologies. Whenever a
speaker utters a sentence in an appropriate context with certain intentions, he performs one or
more illocutionary acts." JOHN R. SEARLE & DANIEL VANDERVEKEN, FOUNDATIONS OF
ILLOCUTIONARY LOGIC 1 (1985). The effect, the illocutionary act performed, in uttering a
sentence, should not be confused with the effect on the hearer or reader. By asking the
question, "Have you seen John?" I might cause you a crisis of conscience (you just saw your
friend John photocopying secret documents). Nevertheless, the illocutionary act carried out
by uttering those words is just that of asking a question. The term originated in J.L. AUSTIN,
How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS 99-131 (1962); see also JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS:
AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 24-25 (1969).
46. Beardsley, supra note 45, at 478. "In short, the wine is praised in Keats's lines, but not
in Alston's: a secondary illocutionary act is performed, as well as the primary one." Id. The
quoted lines from Keats are followed by "Tasting of Flora and the country green, Dance, and
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the distinction made in linguistics between syntax and semantics.
Syntax deals with the grammar of a language;47 semantics deals with
its interpretation and meaning.48 Semantics, however, is connected to
syntax. We learn to use and understand language in terms of stimulus
and response.4 9 We learn to say "red" when exposed to certain sensa-
tions; and when exposed to the word "red" (its sound or, as seen here,
its appearance), we call up certain sensations. Learning to understand
and use a sentence, however, is more complicated than merely form-
ing a habitual association of that sentence with a certain stimulus.5 °
Competent speakers of a natural language,5 who possess a finite
vocabulary and grammatical base, can produce and comprehend an
indefinite number of new sentences in that language. They can create
new sentences never before spoken or written by anyone, and other
competent speakers of that language will understand these sentences.
For example, it is unlikely that anyone has previously written the sen-
tence: "Skinny lawyers with bald, sunburned heads who wear green
and blue polka dot bowties are particularly good at mowing lawns."
Nevertheless, the sentence is understood by any person who speaks
English.
This is explained by supposing that the meanings of complex
expressions are developed out of the meanings of their parts by using
Provencal song, and sunburnt mirth!" Keats, supra note 43, at 349. It is unlikely that anyone
could successfully paraphrase these lines.
47. "Syntax is a study which classifies expressions into various categories (such as nouns,
verbs, etc.), and states principles according to which expressions of various categories can be
combined. (For example, an adjective can modify a noun, so adjectives and nouns have a
certain syntactic relation. Adjectives are not related to prepositions in the same way, for an
adjective doesn't modify a preposition.)" JOHN T. KEARNS, THE PRINCIPLES OF DEDUCTIVE
LOGIC, 4..5 (1988) (emphasis omitted).
48. "Semantics is a study of the meanings of expressions and the truth conditions of their
sentences. Semantic relations between expressions are based on their meanings." Id. at 5.
"Semantics, which is the study of meaning, is also concerned with the way in which the
meanings of complex expressions in the language are determined by the structure of the
expressions together with the meanings of the simple components occurring in the
expressions." DONALD NUTE, ESSENTIAL FORMAL SEMANTICS 4 (1981) (emphasis omitted).
"The study of the interpretation of the language as an interpretation is called semantics." 1
ALONZO CHURCH, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL LOGIC 64 (1956) (emphasis omitted).
49. WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 81-85 (1960). On the dispute
concerning the role of behavioral conditioning in language acquisition, see Danny D.
Steinberg, Overview, in SEMANTICS 485 (Danny D. Steinberg & Leon A. Jakobovits eds.,
1971).
50. An example is forming a habitual association of the sentence "I am thirsty" with
certain somatic sensations.
51. A natural language, such as English, Japanese or Russian, is an historically
conditioned language that developed and evolved naturally, through its use over the course of
many years. An artificial language is a made-up language. Artificial languages may be
intended as vehicles for human communication, as in Esperanto, or as logical or scientific
instruments, as in Fortran and other computer languages.
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rules that parallel the rules of syntax.52 A person who internalizes the
syntax of a language and knows the meaning of simple expressions is
able to do two things; first, to combine simpler expressions in order to
produce more complex ones; and second, to combine the meanings of
the simpler expressions to produce a more complex meaning. The
semantical rules for a language are dependent on its syntax. The rules
used to work out the meaning of complex expressions closely parallel
the rules used to construct them.53
Thus, form and meaning, syntax and semantics, are interdepen-
dent. However, this does not mean that different forms, which will
inevitably have meanings that differ, cannot have very similar content.
[D]istinctness of style from content requires not that exactly the
same thing may be said in different ways but only that what is said
may vary nonconcomitantly with ways of saying. Pretty clearly
there are often very different ways of saying things that are very
nearly the same. Conversely, and often more significantly, very
different things may be said in much the same way-not, of course
by the same text but by texts that have in common certain charac-
teristics that constitute a style.... Even without synonymy, style
and subject do not become one.54
Although a nonliteral copyist can never fully duplicate the mean-
ing found in the original author's work, the duplication may justify a
finding of infringement." But caution is needed before accepting the
notion that meaning/content/semantics has been taken when form/
syntax is radically different. The most individualized contributions of
52. This is known as the "Principle of Compositionality" or "Frege's Principle." See
DAVID R. Dowry ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO MONTAGUE SEMANTICS 7-10 (1981). See also
MARK DE BRETTON PLATTS, WAYS OF MEANING 43-49 (1979). This principle has been
attacked by a number of prominent philosophers and linguists, including Benson Mates and
Noam Chomsky. For a review of their criticisms and a response, see JERROLD J. KATZ,
LANGUAGE AND OTHER ABSTRACT OBJECTS 138-42 (1981).
53. The theory is that in a "logically perfect" language, there would be a perfect parallel
between syntax and semantics. "[T]he desired result [is] that the semantical evaluation of an
expression exactly recapitulates its grammatical construction." David Kaplan, What is
Russell's Theory of Descriptions, in THE LOGIC OF GRAMMAR 214 (Donald Davidson &
Gilbert Harman eds., 1975). For an explanation of the concept of a logically perfect language,
see id. at 210-17.
54. GOODMAN, supra note 24, at 24-25.
55. To prove infringement, a plaintiff must show ownership of the copyright by the
plaintiff and copying by the defendant. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.01 (1993). Without direct proof, plaintiff can establish copying
by showing that the defendant had access to her work and that there is "substantial" or
"probative" similarity between the two works. Id. Substantial similarity may also be used in
determining whether the "copying went so far as to constitute improper appropriation."
Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863
(1975); see Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946); see generally infra notes 83-95
and accompanying text.
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an author are ordinarily found in what is literal. Indeed, the greater a
work of art, the more stubbornly it resists simple explanation and the
more difficult it is to abstract from it that which makes it unique.
A line may be stolen; but the pervading spirit of a great poet is not
to be surreptitiously obtained by a plagiarist. The continued imita-
tion of twenty-five centuries has left Homer as it found him.
5 6
The meaning found in a work tends to be more universal-dependent
on the 'way society as a whole has structured language, and on the
vast accumulation of human experience that is our common heritage.
Therefore, copyright should protect the meaning embedded within a
work less rigorously than it protects a work's literal elements. It is
important to avoid allowing a monopoly on these deeper structures,
this universal heritage. Those who make early use of them should not
prevent others, who have been exposed to their works, and who may
have derived ideas from them, from making use of what belongs to all.
III. SCOPE OF PROTECTION-COPYRIGHTABILITY AND
INFRINGEMENT
The line that distinguishes idea from expression cannot be drawn
between the form of a work and its substance. Where then is it to be
drawn? As Professor Kaplan noted about the decision in Nichols,"
"Hand's explanation does, I think, sharpen our awareness of what we
are about, but surely the technique described lacks precision. We are
in a viscid quandary once we admit that 'expression' can consist of
anything not close aboard the particular collocation in its sequential
order. "13
Unfortunately, the confusing overlap between the notions of
copyrightability and infringement makes this quandary even stickier.
The baic principle underlying the dichotomy is that expression is
protected but ideas are not. These unprotected ideas, however, tend
56. THOMAS B. MACAULAY, CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL ESSAYS, quoted in Umbreit,
supra note: 35, at 949 n.78. See Miller v. City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990) (en
banc) (Posmer, J., concurring). Judge Posner quotes T.S. ELIOT'S The Wasteland: "Highbury
bore me. Richmond and Kew/ Undid me. By Richmond I raised my knees/ Supine on the
floor of a narrow canoe./ My feet are at Moorgate, and my heart/ Under my feet. After the
event/ He wept. He promised 'a new start'/ I made no comment. What should I resent?" Id.
at 1095. Posner says that the idea that might be extracted from the passage is that sex is sordid
and disgusting. "It is the expression that gives the idea impact .... The idea in itself is
nothing-banal, undeveloped, mostly false .... These are just the materials from which the
great writer or popular entertainer makes ... art or popular entertainment." Id.
57. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
58. KAPLAN, supra note 26, at 48. Indeed, Judge Hand himself said, in a later case, that
"no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the 'idea,' and has
borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc." Peter Pan Fabrics
v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
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to exist, at least in the context of copyright cases, within works that
are copyrightable and copyrighted. Ideas, like facts, 9 scenes a faire,"
and expressions that can take only a limited number of forms,61 are
termed unprotectible elements within that protected work.62 Copy-
right can be thought of as something in the nature of a swiss cheese-
full of holes. The unprotectible elements within a work, however,
cannot be simply snipped out as with a scissors. Rather, they must be
conceptualized out by the perceiver, who will need to make judgments
and evaluations.
Thus, any attempt to distinguish protected from unprotected ele-
ments within a copyrighted work requires a consideration of the scope
of copyright. When we ask to what extent a copyrighted work is pro-
tected, we imply another question: what is the work protected
against? To what extent may others use elements taken from a copy-
righted work without infringement?63 The scope of copyright protec-
tion is interwoven with the question of infringement.
This interweaving is the source of several problems. First, the
idea/expression distinction is stated in absolute terms - ideas are not
protectible - but dealt with in terms of comparisons. Second, the
traditional test for infringement, which requires a showing of owner-
ship of the copyright by the plaintiff and copying by the defendant,
6 4
does not deal adequately with the scope of copyright protection. This
inadequacy is compounded by the use or misuse of intrinsic and
extrinsic tests.
A. Absolutes and Comparisons
Courts ordinarily apply the distinction between idea and expres-
59. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841
(1980); see also BarrisFrazer Enters. v. Goodson-Todman Enters., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1887
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
60. Scenes a faire have been defined as "incidents, characters or settings which are as a
practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic."
Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See generally Leslie A. Kurtz,
Copyright: The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, 41 FLA. L. REV. 79 (1989).
61. Toro Co. v. R & R Products, 787 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1986); Morrisey v. Proctor &
Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967); BarrisFrazer Enters. v. Goodson-Todman Enters., 5
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1887 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
62. See Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 691 (2d Cir. 1926) (The copyright statute protects
all copyrightable components of the copyrighted work, which presupposes that there is much
in what is called a copyrighted work that remains unprotected).
63. As Professor Nimmer has pointed out, the idea/expression dichotomy is less a limit on
a work's copyrightability than "a measure of the degree of similarity which must exist as
between a copyrightable work and an unauthorized copy, in order to constitute the latter an
infringement." I NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 55, § 2.03[D].
64. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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sion in the context of infringement cases,65 which compare the plain-
tiff's and defendant's works. This use of comparisons is essential in
discussing the distinction, because attempting to identify the idea of a
work in the abstract makes little sense. What is the idea of Romeo
and Juliet? What is the idea of Seurat's Grande Jatte? Is it the idea of
painting; people in the park on a Sunday afternoon or of using tiny
dots of pure color to create a visual image, or both? Perhaps it was
painted as an anti-Impressionist manifesto.66 Many different ideas
inhere in any work, depending on how one thinks about it, and who
does the thinking. It is impossible to isolate a single unprotected idea
within a work. Indeed, when courts state that some element in the
plaintiff's work is an unprotected idea, that element usually is chosen
for consideration because it was one that was allegedly taken by the
defendant.
In the Nichols case, Judge Hand spoke of a point in a series of
abstractions where expression becomes idea.67 If we look only at the
plaintiff's work, how are the levels of abstraction within that work to
be determined? Where, in the many series of possible abstractions, is
the line between idea and expression crossed? The variables are end-
less. If, however, we compare the plaintiff's and defendant's works,
the inquiry gains clarity and focus. We can consider the level of
abstraction at which the similarities between the plaintiff's work and
the defendant's work lie. We can then attempt to determine, in that
specific context, whether the similarity lies on the idea or expression
side of the line. It is unnecessary to determine at what hypothetical
point that line is crossed, or whether other, hypothetical uses would
infringe.
Thus, in dealing with the distinction between idea and expres-
sion, it is important to remember that the point is not to determine
the idea of the plaintiff's work or the line at which idea shades into
expression within the plaintiff's work. 68 Rather, we need to determine
65. In a few rare situations, the issue of whether a work contains any protectible
expression will arise on review of a decision by the Register of Copyrights to refuse registration
of a work because in contains no protectible expression. See Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888
F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 801 (1947). Such a refusal is inappropriate, because any work in fixed form
must, by definition, contain literal expression. The amount of protectible expression may be so
thin that the work will receive little or no protection by virtue of its copyright, but this should
be determined in an infringement context.
66. See PHOEBE POOL, IMPRESSIONISM 167 (1967).
67. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). See supra note 37 and
accompanying text.
68. In some cases, where courts have tried to determine the idea, the results have been
unfortunate. See Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.
1986) (discussed infra notes 149-55 and accompanying text); see also McCulloch v. Albert E.
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whether that which is copied from the plaintiff by the defendant
should be called unprotected idea or protected expression. This
should be accomplished by examining the nature of the similarities
between the plaintiff's and defendant's works.
B. Testing for Infringement
Traditionally, copyright infringement is established when a
plaintiff proves ownership of the copyright and copying by the
defendant.6 9 In the absence of direct proof of copying, such as an
admission by the defendant, the plaintiff will seek to establish copying
by showing that the defendant had access to the allegedly infringed
work and that the defendant's work is substantially similar to the
plaintiff's.70 The extent of similarity between the two works is rele-
vant in determining whether, based upon circumstantial evidence, the
defendant's work was independently created or copied.7'
Not all forms of copying, however, amount to infringment.
Copying the "idea" from someone else's work is permissible.72 In
Nichols, for example, the plaintiff's play and the defendant's motion
picture both concerned a quarrel between a Jewish and Irish father,
the marriage of their children, the birth of grandchildren, and a rec-
onciliation.73 Judge Hand said that even if the defendant copied those
elements from the plaintiff, there was no infringement. "Though the
plaintiff discovered the vein, she could not keep it to herself; so
defined, the theme was too generalized an abstraction from what she
Price, Inc., 823 F.2d 316, 318-20 (9th Cir. 1987) (the idea of a decorative red plate with floral
design and the phrase "You Are Special Today" was honoring someone at dinner); cf. Lotus
Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990) (the court was forced
into complex contortions because, at least in theory, it had to decide the extent to which the
plaintiff's program was protectible without comparing it to the defendant's).
69. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 55, § 13.01, n.5.1 (prior to 1991, these elements
were probably the most oft-cited passage in the Treatise). In the most recent version of the
Treatise, the authors state, however, that the term encompasses "copying as a factual
proposition" and "improper appropriation, i.e. actionable copying as a legal proposition." Id.
§ 13.03[A1.
70. See ALAN LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 161 (5th ed. 1978); 3 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 55, § 13.01[B]. Substantial similarity exists if "the fundamental essence
or structure of one work is duplicated in another." Id. § 13.03[A][I].
71. There is no copyright infringement in the absence of copying. An independently
created work does not infringe, however similar it is to an earlier work.
72. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text; see also Lewys v. O'Neill, 49 F.2d 603,
607 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (quoting AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, Literary Larceny, in SEVEN LECTURES
ON THE LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS 167 (1899)) ("Ideas... are free as air.
If you happen to have any, you fling them into the common stock, and ought to be well
content to see your poorer brethren thriving upon them.").
73. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
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wrote. It was only a part of her 'ideas'."74 Another court7" said that
even if the defendant copied the idea of a remote broadcast inter-
rupted by an armed robber, the copying was not actionable "because
it is only of an idea, and the handling, scenes, details and characteri-
zation used by plaintiffs and defendants in their works based on this
idea are unquestionably not substantially similar."
'7 6
The need to distinguish idea from expression arises in instances
of non.literal copying. The defendant has added something to the
plaintiff's material to reshape or recast it. In such a case, it is neces-
sary to determine how far "an imitator must depart from an undeviat-
ing reproduction to escape infringement."' 77  Thus, infringement
involves than ownership and copying. Copyright does not and should
not forbid all forms of non-literal copying, all forms of making use of
another's copyrighted work.
It is, therefore, important to ask not simply whether there has
been copying, but what it is that has been copied. A copyrighted
work is protected, but not against every sort of taking. Indeed, there
are cases that acknowledge copying, at least in the sense of the
defendant making use of the plaintiff's work in creating its own, but
where the courts found no infringement. 78 For example, in Universal
Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld,79 the parties disputed whether the
defendants had traced the stick figures in the plaintiff's weight-lifting
chart or had merely copied them freehand. Everyone agreed that the
defendant copied these figures. Nevertheless, the court found that
this copying was insufficiently substantial for infringement.80 In
74. Id. at 122. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 2,.98 U.S. 669 (1936). This case involved several fictional versions of the same murder
and trial. Judge Hand said that defendants could use not only material the plaintiffs did not
originate, but "even the plaintiffs' contribution itself, if they drew from it only the more
general patterns; that is, if they kept clear of its 'expressions'." Id. at 54; see also Dymow v.
Bolton, 1.1 F.2d 690, 691 (2d Cir. 1926) (even if the defendant copied the plaintiffs plot, he did
not infringe; copyright does not protect ideas and fundamental plots).
75. Giangrasso v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 534 F. Supp. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
76. i'd. at 476.
77. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
78. Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1989); Universal Athletic Sales Co. v.
Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975); Runstadler Studios, Inc. v.
MCM Ltd. Partnership, 768 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods.,
443 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); cf. Laureyssens v. Idea Group Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (2d
Cir. 1992) (access and similarities at least raise a question of actual copying, leaving unlawful
appropriation as the central concern).
79. 511 F.2d 904 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975).
80. The court said that "substantial similarity to show that the original work has been
copied is not the same as substantial similarity to prove infringement .... While '[r]ose is a
rose is a rose is a rose,' substantial similarity is not always substantial similarity." Id. at 907.
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Narell v. Freeman,8 the author of an allegedly infringing novel admit-
ted that she consulted and used the plaintiff's historical book during
her research and that she took some language from it. The court did
not deem it to be infringement, however, because the defendant cop-
ied only facts, ideas, and short, ordinary phrases.82
Some courts recognize that proof of copying may not always suf-
fice to show infringement and add a requirement of improper appro-
priation.13 The meaning of "improper appropriation," however, like
so much in copyright, is ill-defined. Perhaps the closest thing to a
definition is the rather circular statement that unlawful appropriation
is a taking of "the independent work of the copyright owner which is
entitled to the statutory protection." 84 Unlawful appropriation, how-
ever, does encompass two limitations on what is considered
infringement.
First, some courts focus on the value and importance of what is
taken, and thus the effect of the copying upon the plaintiff's market.8"
In Arnstein v. Porter,"6 the plaintiff claimed that Cole Porter had
infringed a number of musical compositions he had written. Judge
Frank, writing for the majority, distinguished two separate elements
in a copyright suit: "(a) that defendant copied from plaintiff's copy-
righted work and (b) that the copying (assuming it to be proved) went
so far as to constitute improper appropriation."8 The existence of
improper appropriation, said Judge Frank, depends upon the reaction
of the audience:
The plaintiff's legally protected interest is not, as such, his reputa-
tion as a musician but his interest in the potential financial returns
from his compositions which derive from the lay public's approba-
tion of his efforts. The question, therefore, is whether defendant
took from plaintiff's works so much of what is pleasing to the ears
81. Narell, 872 F.2d at 910.
82. Id. at 911.
83. See, e.g., Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1992); Ford
Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 291 (3d Cir. 1991); Walker v. Time
Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1986); Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer
Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Universal
Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975);
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). See also 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6,
§ 7.1 (plaintiff must show that, "taken together, the elements copied amount to an improper
appropriation.").
84. Summit Motor Prods., 930 F.2d at 291 (quoting Salkeld, 511 F.2d at 908).
85. Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 736-37 (4th Cir. 1990); Salkeld, 511
F.2d at 907-08; Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468 (2d Cir. 1946); see also Midway Mfg., Co. v. Bandai-
America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1982).
86. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
87. Id. at 468.
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of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such popular
music is composed, that defendant wrongfully appropriated some-
thing which belongs to the plaintiff."8
If an artist sits before a painting for days, copying it, but produces
something very unlike the original, nothing requiring protection has
been taken. Improper appropriation occurs only if the defendant's
copying captures the audience and thus the economic rewards that
would otherwise belong to the plaintiff.8 9
Other courts focus on the nature of the material taken from the
plaintiff's work, distinguishing between protected and unprotected
elements.90 The court in Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., for example
stated that the "[plaintiff] must show that his book was 'copied,' by
proving access and substantial9' similarity between the works, and
also show that his expression was 'improperly appropriated,' by prov-
ing that the similarities relate to copyrightable material." '92 Similari-
ties that support an inference of copying may also support a finding of
improper appropriation, but such a finding is not inevitable.93 Works
may be similar because the defendant makes use of elements in the
plaintiff's work such as ideas, facts, or scenes a faire. Because copying
such elements is permitted, these similarities, however substantial
they may appear, are not sufficient for a finding of infringement. Pro-
fessor Goldstein deals with this problem, saying: "To prove improper
appropriation, the plaintiff must show (a) that at least some of the
elements that the defendant copied constitute protected subject mat-
ter, and (b) that audiences will find these elements in the defendant's
work to be similar to elements in the plaintiff's work." 94 The court in
Dymow v. Bolton95 put it slightly differently: it is necessary to decide
88. Id. at 473.
89. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, § 7.1.2.
90. See Narrell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 910 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The underlying question
is whether protected elements of Narell's book were copied."); see also Laureyssens v. Group
Idea, In,., 964 F.2d 131, 141 (2d Cir. 1992) (considering "whether substantial similarity as to
protectible material exists between the works at issue"); Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784
F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1986) (similarities must relate to copyrightable material); Atari Inc. v.
North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
880 (19:32) (copyright precludes appropriation only of protected elements of a work).
91. Professor Latman has suggested that similarity, in order to be probative of copying,
need net be substantial. Alan Latman, "Probative Similarity" as Proof of Copying: Toward
Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1214 (1990).
(The iss.ue that must be determined is whether the access and similarity that exist in the case
provide sufficient circumstantial evidence of copying.)
92. Walker, 784 F.2d at 48.
93. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, § 7.1. See Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511
F.2d 9(4, 907 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975); supra note 80.
94. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, § 7.1.
95. 11 F.2d 690, 692 (2d Cir. 1926).
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whether an appropriation (a) is of copyrightable material, and (b) is
substantial.
The often recited mantra that copying is the only requirement for
infringement is misleading and incorrect. Not all copying is forbid-
den. When a defendant has been exposed to the plaintiff's work and
has made some use of it, we need to determine whether this use is
permissible or not. Although some courts have recognized this need,
the recognition has been haphazard and erratic. Copying and
improper appropriation are separate issues and should be treated as
such.
C. Confusion Compounded-Intrinsic and Extrinsic Tests
This tangle is further snarled by the distinction that is often
made between using extrinsic and intrinsic tests in determining
whether infringement exists. The central source of this muddle is
probably the Ninth Circuit decision in Sid & Marty Krofft Television
v. McDonald's Corp.96 The court recognized that the classic distinc-
tion between an idea and its expression provides a means of limiting
the scope of copyright. 97 In seeking to provide such a limiting princi-
ple, however, the court caused more problems than it solved. The
Krofft court created a two-part test. The first prong requires a deter-
mination of whether the plaintiff's and defendant's works are substan-
tially similar in ideas, using an objective "extrinsic" test, which
permits analytic dissection and expert testimony. 98 The second prong
requires a determination of whether there is substantial similarity in
expression, using a subjective "intrinsic" test, which does not permit
such dissection and testimony. 99
This approach fails to deal adequately with the distinction
between idea and expression. Which sorts of similarities should be
called idea, requiring the extrinsic test, and which are expression,
requiring the unanalytical intrinsic approach? Furthermore, an
intrinsic test may work reasonably well in cases like Arnstein v.
Porter,"° or Krofft itself, where the basic issue is the effect of the
defendant's copying on the plaintiff's market. 10 ' In determining the
value and importance of what was taken, the response of the audience
96. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
97. The court was concerned that requiring no more than ownership, access, and
substantial similarity could create untenable results. Id. at 1162. The idea/expression
distinction was seen as providing a needed limiting principle. Id. at 1163.
98. Id. at 1164.
99. Id.
100. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
101. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
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to the total look and feel of the works is significant.10 2 The test is
singularly unhelpful, however, in seeking to determine whether the
defendant has taken protectible or unprotectible elements from the
plaintiff's work. In pursuing this inquiry, analysis and dissection are
essential 1
0 3
Perhaps recognizing this problem, the Ninth Circuit reformu-
lated Krofft in later cases, making it more workable by including more
and more under the rubric of "idea," thus allowing more analysis." °
Eventually, in Shaw v. Lindheim,l°5 the court explicitly stated that, at
least in the context of evaluating literary works, the application of the
Krofft two-part test was "more sensibly described as objective and
subjective analyses" of similarity in expression." ° Thus, the Shaw
court apparently incorporated into its test for infringement something
akin to both kinds of improper appropriation.10 7 The court failed,
however, to distinguish between the similarity required to prove copy-
ing and that necessary to establish improper appropriation. 0 8
Other courts, outside the Ninth Circuit, have created similar dif-
ficultie;. In Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc. ,"o for example, the court
said that a plaintiff must first show actual copying by demonstrating
access and substantial similarity. 10 The plaintiff then must demon-
strate that the copying amounted to improper or unlawful appropria-
tion by showing that the substantial similarities related to protectible
materials."' This was an excellent beginning. Unfortunately, the
court added that dissection is proper for determining whether copying
102. See Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 735 (4th Cir. 1990) ("The lay
listener's reaction is relevant because it gauges the effect of the defendant's work on the
plaintiff's market.").
103. See Runstadler Studios, Inc. v. MCM Ltd. Partnership, 768 F. Supp. 1292, 1297 (N.D.
Ill. 1991) (Copyright forbids appropriating only those elements of a work that are protected by
copyright, and establishing those parameters requires analytical dissection.).
104. These cases enormously expanded the meaning of idea, saying that the test for
substantial similarity of ideas compares "not the basic plot ideas for stories, but the actual
concrete elements that make up the total sequence of events and the relationships between the
major characters .... [It] requires a comparison of plot, theme, dialogue, mood, setting, pace
and sequence.'" Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826
(1985) (quoting Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1052 (1985)); see Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1989).
105. 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990).
106. In Pasillas v. McDonald's Corp., 927 F.2d 440, 442 (9th Cir. 1991), the court said that
the Shaw holding was limited to literary works.
107. See supra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
108. See Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1361-62.
109. 964 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1992).
110. The court noted that it is not always necessary to prove substantial similarity in order
to prove copying. Id. at 140.
111. Id. at 139-40.
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has taken place but is irrelevant to determining unlawful appropria-
tion. 12 As in Krofft, analysis is forbidden in making a most analytical
determination.' 3
The importance of the distinction between idea and expression
lies in its use to sort actionable takings from those that should be
permitted. Because some copying is allowed, it is necessary to deter-
mine how much or, conversely, how far exclusive rights should
extend. Focusing on similarities in the look and feel of a work, on its
overall impression, will likely lead to overprotective results. These
similarities may result from the use of elements such as ideas, facts,
and scenes a faire. The notion that substantial similarity in expres-
sion, not just idea, is required serves the goal of distinguishing
between those forms of non-literal copying that are actionable and
those that are not. It safeguards the raw material that makes creation
possible and avoids unnecessarily curtailing the ability of new authors
to create new works.
IV. NATURE OF AN IDEA
As Judge Hand noted, it is impossible to fix the boundary
between those things copyright calls ideas and those it calls expres-
sion.II4 It may be possible, however, to fathom its mystery, at least a
little, by circling around the notion of idea and its distinction from
expression. As definition fails, let us speak with the ghosts in a few
different contexts.
A. The Meaning of Idea
The word "idea" is derived from a Greek term, meaning "a form,
112. Id. at 140. See Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Products, Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 291
(3d Cir. 1991) (An extrinsic test is used to determine whether similarities are sufficient to
demonstrate copying, but an intrinsic test is used to determine whether improper
appropriation exists.).
113. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157
(9th Cir. 1977). Indeed, the court in Laureyssens seemingly recognized the problem,
commenting that when a design contains both protectible and unprotectible elements, the
ordinary observer's inspection must be discerning, ignoring unprotectible aspects of the
plaintiff's work when comparing it to defendant's. Laureyssens, 964 F.2d at 141. The same
concern was expressed in Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d
607 (7th Cir. 1982). While dissection is generally disfavored in determining improper
appropriation, "the ordinary observer test, in application, must take into account that the
copyright laws preclude appropriation of only those elements of the work that are protected by
the copyright." Id. at 614.
114. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). See Nash v.
CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990) (Hand's test, "while a clever way to pose the
difficulties [in distinguishing between idea and expression], does little to help resolve a given
case.").
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the look: or appearance of a thing as opposed to its reality, from idein,
to see."" ' 5 In the Timaeus, Plato saw ideas as eternal paradigms,
independent objects to which the divine demiurge looks as patterns in
forming the world. 1 6 This was later modified to the religious concep-
tion of ideas as the thoughts of God." 7 "It is not a very long step to
extend the term 'idea' to cover patterns, blueprints, or plans in any-
one's mind, not only in God's.""'  The word entered the French and
English vernacular in the 1600s"I and possessed two meanings. The
first was the Platonic meaning of a perfect exemplar or paradigm.
The second, which probably has its origin with Descartes, is of a
mental concept or image 120 or, more broadly, any object of the mind
when it is active.' 2' Objects of thought may exist independently. The
sun exists (probably) before and after you think of it. But it is also
posssible to think of things that have never existed, such as a unicorn
or Pegasus. 122 John Locke defined ideas very comprehensively, to
include: all objects of the mind. 123 Language was a way of translating
the invisible, hidden ideas that make up a person's thoughts into the
115. IEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 901 (2d. ed. 1963); see 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 118 (Paul Edwards
ed., 1967) ("The word 'idea' is a transliteration of a Greek word of which the root meaning is
'see.' ").
116. 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 115, at 118.
117. 11.
118. Id. at 119.
119. Id.
120. "Some of my thoughts are as it were the images of things, and it is only in these cases
that the term 'idea' is strictly appropriate ....... Rene Descartes, Mediation on First
Philosophy, in DESCARTES: SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 88 (John Cottingham et al.
trans., 1988).
121. "I understand [idea] to mean the form of any given thought, immediate perception of
which makes me aware of the thought. Hence, whenever I express something in words, and
understand what I am saying, this very fact makes it certain that there is within me an idea of
what is signified by the words in question." Rene Descartes, Objections and Replies, in
DESCARTES: SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 152-53 (John Cottingham et al. trans.,
1988). Some philosophers have a more limited conception of idea. Leibniz, for example, said
that an idea is something which exists in our minds, but that many things exist in our minds
which a:re not ideas, such as thoughts, perceptions and affections. "In my opinion ... an idea
consists, not in some act, but in the faculty of thinking, and we are said to have an idea of a
thing even if we do not think of it, if only, on a given occasion, we can think of it."
GOTTFR:IED W. LEIBNIZ, GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS AND
LETTEiS 207 (Leroy E. Loemker ed. & trans., 2d ed. 1970). Ideas were seen, not always as
objects of the mind, but also as acts of the mind. Robert McCrae, "Idea" as a Philosophical
Term i. the Seventeenth Century, 25 J. HIST. IDEAS 175, 179-82 (1965).
122. According to Augustine, "the mind has the power to add to or subtract from things, to
alter the deposits left in the memory by experience. Thus, if we add to or subtract from the
form of a raven, we will imagine a creature that does not exist in nature." UMBERTO ECO,
ART AND BEAUTY IN THE MIDDLE AGES 108-09 (H. Bredin trans., 1986).
123. An idea is "whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks ...
whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be
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external, perceptible world of articulate sounds and visible written
symbols that others can understand.
12 4
In discussions of the origin of ideas, three kinds of ideas were
distinguished: innate, adventitious, and factitious. Innate ideas come
from the soul's own depths and are not given to it by the senses.125
They are ideas "which I find in my mind as already impressed upon
it-impressed upon it in its original condition by God."'1 26 Adventi-
tious ideas are "those I experience as being impressed upon the mind
by the actions of bodies outside me," such as the ordinary idea of the
sun.127 Factitious ideas are those which a person produces there, such
as the ideas of the sun astronomers construct by reasoning.
121
However an idea gets into the mind, whether impressed upon it
from the outside, produced from within, or innately residing there,
"idea" means something that exists within a human mind. This
meaning will not suffice, in copyright terms, to divide protectible
expression from unprotectible idea. It would leave a work unpro-
tected against all but literal or nearly literal copying. Copyright pro-
tects against more than the use of an author's words, lines, color,
notes, and the like. Thus ideas, as things existing within a human
mind, dwell on the expression side of the idea/expression dichotomy,
as well as the side labelled idea. Thus, some ideas are protectible, and
others are not.
One court defined an idea as "any conception existing in the
mind as a result of mental understanding, awareness, or activity."
'
129
This sort of idea, however, cannot be copied. When ideas are called
unprotected, this means that there is no "monopoly over the unpar-
ticularized expression of an idea at such a level of abstraction or gen-
erality as unduly to inhibit independent creation by others."'
1 30
B. Abstract v. Concrete Ideas
Because ideas, as they are commonly understood, dwell on both
sides of the idea/expression dichotomy, it is necessary to distinguish
protectible from unprotectible ideas. Perhaps we can sort unpro-
employed about in thinking." JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING 4 (25th ed., William Baynes & Son 1824) (1690).
124. Id. at 291-94.
125. GOTTFRIED W. LEIBNIZ, NEW ESSAYS ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, quoted in IV
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 115, at 119.
126. McCrae, supra note 121, at 184.
127. Id. at 184. See 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 115, at 120.
128. 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supro note 115, at 120; see McCrae, supra note
121, at 184.
129. Gund, Inc. v. Smile Int'l, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 642, 644 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
130. Id.
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tectible abstract ideas (labelled ideas) from protectible concrete ideas
(labelled, expression). The words "abstract" and "concrete" arise in
many cases dealing with the idea/expression distinction. The Nichols
court, for example, found that the defendant's film did not infringe
the plaintiff's play because it was "too generalized an abstraction from
what plaintiff wrote . . . only a part of her ideas." '31 In Eichel v.
Marcin, the court said that authors may exploit facts, experiences,
field of thought, and general ideas found in another's work, "provided
they do not substantially copy a concrete form, in which the circum-
stances and ideas have been developed, arranged, and put into
shape."' 32  Judge Hand, in National Comics Publications, Inc. v.
Fawcett Publications, Inc. said that "no one infringes, unless he
descends so far into what is concrete as to invade.. . 'expression.' ""3
These cases seem to be distinguishing "abstract" ideas from
"concrete" tangible embodiments of these abstractions that may be
termed expression. However, if the concrete form of a work means
more than the literal expression contained within it, it is difficult to
determine what is meant by "concrete." Webster's New Twentieth
Century Dictionary of the English Language provides several mean-
ings for the word concrete. These include: "having a material, per-
ceptible existence; of, belonging to, or characterized by things or
events that can be perceived by the senses; real; actual;" and "refer-
ring to a particular; specific, not general or abstract." '134 Abstract is
defined as: "thought of apart from any particular instances or mate-
rial objects; not concrete" and "expressing a quality thought of apart
from any particular or material object; as, beauty is an abstract
131. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930). See Nash v. CBS
Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990) (scope of protectible expression depends on "the level
of abstraction at which the court conceives the interest protected by the copyright.").
132. Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404, 409 (D.C.N.Y. 1913). See Barris Fraser Enter. v.
Goodson..Todman Enter., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1887 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (similarities too
common and general to approach the concreteness and particularity deserving of copyright
protection); cf. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357-58 (9th Cir. 1990) (testing for
similarities in a lengthy list of concrete elements cannot be seen as testing for mere similarity of
ideas); Narrell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1989) (testing for substantial similarity
requires a comparison not of basic plot ideas, but actual concrete elements that make up the
total sequence of events and relationships); Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1985)
(same).
133. National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 600
(1951). Judge Hand said that there is a point at which the similarities between plantiff's and
defendant's works are so little concrete, and thus so abstract, that they become only the theme,
idea or skeleton of the plot, which are always in the public domain. Shipman v. RKO, 100
F.2d 533, 538 (2d Cir. 1938) (Hand, J., concurring); see also Warner Bros., Inc. v. American
Broadcasting Co., 654 F.2d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 1981) (similarities not sufficiently particular and
concrete to represent an appropriation of the plaintiffs' protected expression).
134. WEBSTER'S, supra note 115, at 378.
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word."' 35
These definitions are not very helpful in sorting what copyright
considers to be idea from what it considers expression. Professor
Goodman notes:
The overwhelming case against perception without concep-
tion, the pure given, absolute immediacy, the innocent eye, sub-
stance as substratum, has been so fully and frequently set forth-
by Berkeley, Kant, Cassirer, Gombrich, Bruner, and many
others-as to need no restatement here .... Although conception
without perception is merely empty, perception without conception
is blind (totally inoperative). . . . [C]ontent vanishes without
form. 1
36
Indeed, it is a mistake to look for a clear dividing line between
the "abstract" and the "concrete." Michael Dummett, in discussing
abstract objects, has suggested that not every object falls clearly
within these two categories. 137 He says that a rough everday method
of distinguishing between concrete and abstract objects is to term con-
crete only those things that can be seen, touched, 1
38 or pointed to. 139
This, however, would leave colorless gas, sound, and smell on the
abstract side of the line.
Dummett suggests that there is a spectrum of objects. Some are
fully concrete, such as a coffee pot, that we can point to and see.
Others are fully abstract and "can be referred to only by means of a
verbal phrase."' I" They can only be introduced by means of lan-
guage, by using other words. Numbers and universals such as justice
are such abstractions. In between the ends of the spectrum are things
that cannot be pointed to, but can be tied to more concrete things.
Shapes and directions fall in this category, as a shape must be the
shape of something, a direction the direction of something. 141 A color
tends towards being more concrete, because it need not be understood
as the color of anything.
This continuum, like Hand's series of abstractions, does not pro-
vide us with a dividing line. It does, however, provide a useful anal-
ogy. As we move toward the most abstract end of the spectrum, we
also move toward the realm of objects whose existence is largely a
135. Id. at 8.
136. GOODMAN, supra note 24, at 6 (citations omitted).
137. MICHAEL A.E. DUMMETr, FREGE: PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 471-511 (2d ed.
1981).
138. Id. at 480.
139. Id. at 481.
140. Id. at 494.
141. Id. at 487.
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reflection of the nature of our society and language, of the perspective
provided by the community. Objects that dwell closer to the concrete
end of the spectrum involve a more dispensable or replaceable use of
language, a particular way of offering a work of art to perception. 142
They are things belonging more uniquely to the speaker.
In the Nichols case, the plaintiff's and defendant's works had in
common lovers whose Irish and Jewish families are at emnity and
whose children bring about a reconciliation. This similarity was
found to be in unprotected idea.1 43 But it is possible to abstract the
similarities still further, by leaving out yet more of the detail. Two
works could both include lovers whose Irish and Jewish families are
at odds; or, more simply, lovers whose families are at odds; or, almost
entirely lacking in detail, the idea of star-crossed lovers.'" The idea
of orchestrating a piano piece can be expanded to the more detailed
idea of using a particular motif in the third movement, and further
expanded to the idea of using a particular percussion instrument in
the 47th stanza. 45 In a case involving two spiral sculptures, 46 the
plaintiff' described the idea of the work as "a spiral sculpture com-
posed of rectangular pieces of glass."' 47 The defendants provided a
more particularized, less abstract description: "a spiral composed of
long and thin rectangular panes of glass that overlie one another,
rotating around a common axis and fastened together with invisible
glue."
1 8
Clearly a work can be abstracted at many levels. This process of
abstraction, however, has proved problematic in cases involving com-
puter programs. In Whelan Associates Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Labora-
tory Inc. ,' 4  the first major case dealing with the scope of their
protection, the defendants did not literally copy the plaintiff's pro-
142. See Eco, supra note 122, at 109 ("Artistic particularity arises from the manner in
which the order and form are made concrete and offered to perception.").
143. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
144. In Nash, the court notes the importance of the level of abstraction at which a court
conceives the interest protected by copyright. If a court choses a low level and protects only
the author's words, a copier might take the entire plot and exposition, although this might be
the mos! important ingredients in the earlier author's creation. If a very high level were
chosen, an author might claim protection for an entire genre, such as the romantic novel. The
appropriate level lies somewhere between the two, but is difficult to locate. Nash v. CBS Inc.,
899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (2d Cir. 1930).
145. Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEo. L.J. 287, 311 (1988).
146. Runstadler Studios Inc. v. MCM Ltd. Partnership, 768 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. Il1. 1991).
147. I'd. at 1298.
148. Id. The court found in favor of the defendant, denying injunctive relief, on the ground
that fror the point of view of a sophisticated observer, the two works differed in concept and
feel. Id. at 1299.
149. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
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gram. Rather, it was claimed that they copied the overall structure
and organization of the plaintiff's program for managing the opera-
tion of a dental laboratory.' Holding that the copyright in computer
programs, like other literary works, is not limited to protecting
against literal copying, the court went on to consider the idea/expres-
sion dichotomy. "[T]he purpose or function of a utilitarian work
would be the work's idea, and everything that is not necessary to that
purpose or function would be part of the expression of the idea."' If
various means exist to accomplish the desired purpose, the means
chosen is expression not idea.'5 2 The idea of the plaintiff's program
was the efficient organization of a dental laboratory.5 3 Thus it would
appear that copying at any less abstract level would be actionable.
This goes absurdly further than the literary cases. It is as if Judge
Hand had identified the idea in the Nichols case as lovers whose fami-
lies are at odds, and had held that any more detailed and less abstract
elaboration of that idea was actionable. The court in Computer Asso-
ciates International v. Altai, Inc. "4 recognized this problem and dis-
agreed with Whelan's assumption that only one idea underlies a
computer program, noting that a given work may consist of a mixture
of numerous ideas and expressions."'
150. Id. at 1233. Earlier cases had involved literal or near-literal copying and considered
whether a variety of computer programs were copyrightable. Challenges based on the idea/
expression dichotomy were generally rejected on the theory that alternative means existed for
writing the programs involved. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l Inc., 725 F.2d
521 (9th Cir. 1984); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d
Cir. 1984); E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp., 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D.Minn. 1985). But see
Synercom Tech. v. University Computing, 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
151. Whelan Assoc., 797 F.2d at 1236.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1240. See Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127,
1132 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (The idea was the concept of creating greeting cards.).
154. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). Recognizing that the utilitarian nature of a computer
program complicates the task of distilling idea from expression, the Altai court proposed a
three-step procedure to determine whether the non-literal elements of a computer program are
substantially similar. First, a court should break down the allegedly infringed program into its
constituent structural parts. Second, the court should sift out unprotected material, such as
ideas, expression that is necessarily incidental to those ideas, and elements taken from the
public domain. Third, it should compare the expressive material that remains with the
structure of the allegedly infringing program. This abstraction/filtration/comparison
approach has been accepted by a number of courts. See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando
Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 834 (10th Cir. 1993); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977
F.2d 1510, 1525 (9th Cir. 1992); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832,
839 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
155. Id. (quoting 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
§ 13.03[F] (1990)); see Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 78, 89 (D. Mass.
1992) (decisionmaker must focus on alternatives along the scale from the most generalized
conception to the most particularized in order to distinguish between idea and expression); cf.
Plains Cotton Co-op Assoc. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir.),
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The process of abstraction can be seen as involving an omission,
a setting aside, as more and more of the detail is left out. 56 Abstrac-
tion "involves somehow stripping an idea not just of the 'circum-
stances' in which its like originally came into one's mind, but also of
some of its internal detail.' ' 5 7 It is those very details or circum-
stances, stripped from a work by the process of abstraction, that are
truly the creations of an author. The more abstract an idea is, the
more detail is left out, the more it is a part of the culture as a whole.
Even if an abstract idea is original to the author, who may be unaware
of its existence in the culture or who may be unconsciously drawing
from the commons, it should not be protected against copying. At
greater levels of abstraction, the idea is no longer truly representative
of the author's unique contribution.
C. The Idea in the Mind of the Perceiver
Art is not a copy of the real world. One of the damn things is
enough.15
8
It seems strange to deny copyright protection to what, at first
glance, appears to be the core of an author's creation, the artistic
center of a work, that noblest of conceptions mentioned by Bran-
deis.' 59 It is not, however, the author's ideas per se that are denied
protection by the idea/expression dichotomy. We say that a defend-
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987) (similarities in sequence and organization of cotton
marketing software, dictated by the externalities of the cotton market, may constitute ideas).
See also supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
156. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
157. JONATHAN F. BENNETT, LOCKE, BERKELEY, HUME, CENTRAL THEMES 21 (1971).
Berkeley criticicized this approach, saying that he can imagine a man with two heads, but
cannot conceive the abstract idea of a man, retaining only what is common to all men. Id. at
36 (quoting BERKELEY'S, PRINCIPLES INTRODUCTION § 10). Bennett says that "someone can
close his eyes and picture a woman's face, neither 'seeing' her as smiling nor 'seeing' her as
unsmiling .... I play a tune in my head, and I 'hear' it as orchestrated, which is different from
'hearing' it as played on a tin whistle; yet I do not 'hear' it as orchestrated in any completely
specific fashion, neither as involving at least three oboes nor as involving fewer than three
oboes; and so my auditory idea or image is abstract." Id. at 22. He suggests that "one can
omit from an induced image of a [theta] only such details as one could fail to notice when
actually perceiving a [theta] and noticing that it was a [theta]." Id. at 41.
158. GOODMAN, supra note 25, at 3 (reported as occurring in an essay on Virginia Woolf).
Goodman says, "the world is as many ways as it can be truly described, seen, pictured, etc.,
and ... there is no such thing as the way the world is. Id. at 6 n.4.
159. S ee supra note 5 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the ideas found unprotected in
the casei. are often far from noble and indeed rather trite. Of course, not all ideas are noble;
many are banal and far from stirring. See. e.g., Conan Properties, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 712 F.
Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (cartoonist cannot obtain the right to the idea of a superhuman
muscleman). See Umbreit, supra note 35, at 949 (quoting BIRRELL, COPYRIGHT 170-71
(1899) (" 'in reading the cases in the Reports for the last hundred years, you cannot overlook
the literary insignificance of the contending volumes.' ").
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ant has taken an author's ideas, but that is not what happens. The
author's ideas remain locked within that author's mind. What the
alleged infringer takes is the perceiver's conception of the idea or
ideas inhering in the work.
In an early case, the Supreme Court spoke of writings "by which
the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible expression.""
Ideas that exist within the author's skull, however, are not capable of
appropriation. 161 Copyright deals with ideas only as they are embod-
ied in a work of authorship. From the author's point of view, to the
extent that a temporal relationship exists between what is in the
author's mind and what the author produces, 162 an idea will precede
the work itself; the literal expression is derived from the underlying
idea. That which exists in intangible, conceptual form within the
mind of the author is expressed in tangible, perceptible form in the
author's work.
The tangible thing, that which is perceived, is expression in the
purest sense-the precise words, lines, colors, notes. 163 Anything else,
whether termed protectible expression or unprotectible ideas, is a der-
ivation, abstracted from the literal expression, which is the true crea-
tion of the author. As Berkeley stated: "[iun reading a book, what I
immediately perceive are the letters, but mediately, or by means of
these, are suggested to my mind the notions of God, virtue, truth,
etc. , ,164
160. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884); see Millar v. Taylor, 98
Eng. Rep. 201, 242 (K.B. 1769), where Justice Yates, in his famed dissent, said "[i]deas are
free. But while the author confines them to his study, they are like birds in a cage, which none
but he can have a right to let fly: for, till he thinks proper to emancipate them, they are under
his own dominion."
161. See Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86 (1899) (citing Jeffreys v. Boosey, 10 Eng. Rep.
681, 702 (H.L.C. 1854)); Gund, Inc. v. Smile Int'l, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 642, 644 (E.D.N.Y.
1988) (It is impossible to copy a conception in someone's mind.).
162. Such a temporal relationship is not always clear. Conception and making can interact.
An author may put on paper ideas that are already conceived and ordered. But sometimes an
author may "depend upon the greater perceptibility induced by the activity and its sensible
report to direct his completion of the work." JOHN DEWEY, ART AS EXPERIENCE 51 (1934).
Art, "nourished by intellectual insight and skilled craftsmanship, involves an arduous process
in which physical manipulations do not follow the conceptions of the intellect, but are the
intellect conceiving something by making it." Eco, supra note 122, at 111.
163. In art, expression is visually perceptible. Music, as heard, will differ by performance
and literature is filtered through comprehension. See Richard Wollheim, Art and Its Objects,
in PHILOSOPHY LOOKS AT THE ARTS, supra note 45, at 208.
164. GEORGE BERKELEY, THREE DIALOGUES 12 (Colin M. Turbayne ed., 1954). Berkeley
also discussed painting, saying "[When] you behold the picture of Julius Caesar, do you see
with your eyes any more than some colours and figures, with a certain symmetry and
composition of the whole?" Berkeley noted that a man who knew nothing of Julius Caesar
would see as much, but his thoughts would not be directed to the Roman Emperor. Berkeley
said the reason for this proceeds from reason and memory. Bennett comments that
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Fu:rthermore, the artist's "idea" is forever unknown and
unknowable to the perceiver. In the visual arts, for example, the same
image can derive from very different intentions. Goodman compares
an electorcardiogram with a Hokusai drawing of Mount Fujiyama.
The black wiggly lines on white backgrounds may be identical, says
Goodman, but they are not the same. "The difference is syntactic:
the constitutive aspects of the diagrammatic as compared with the
pictorial character are expressly and narrowly restricted."' 65 The
only important elements of the diagram are the ordinate and abscissa
of each of the points the line passes through; thickness of line, depth
of color, and intensity are irrelevant. For the sketch, however, thick-
ening o:r thinning of the line, contrast with the background, size, even
quality of the paper, are important. 
66
Danto discusses two works, each two rectangles, one on top of
the other. They appear identical. Artist B describes his work as a
mass, pressing downward, met by a mass pressing upward. Artist A
says that in hers, the line through the space is the path of an isolated
particle, and that the path, going from edge to edge, gives a sense of
its going beyond. 167 Here are two very different ideas, and two identi-
cal works. Could a perceiver tell which was created by which author?
Or could either be distingished from a pure abstraction looking
exactly like A and B?168
From an analyst's point of view, the point of view of a decision-
maker in a copyright case, the work is the starting point. We must
start with the literal expression found within the work and from there
derive its idea or ideas. Determining the degree of protection pro-
vided, which involves ascertaining what sort of copying the work is
protected against, requires the exercise of conception, not just percep-
tion. The reader/viewer/hearer/perceiver must do some work; it is
not possible to compare the allegedly infringed and infringing works
in a purely rote fashion, and determine the nature of the similarities
between them. The perceiver must abstract from a work and conceive
of what it is. This conception may or may not be the same as what
the author conceived. She reads/looks/listens and conceives her own
"background knowledge and the ability to relate it to the sensory present" are involved, but
also involved is the knowledge that one is confronted by a picture, "that is, by a physical object
which can be touched and moved around, which would look different in various lights, and so
on." BENNETT, supra note 157, at 141.
165. GOODMAN, supra note 25, at 229.
166. Id.
167. Arthur Danto, The Artworld, in PHILOSOPHY LOOKS AT THE ARTS, supra note 45, at
154, 160.
168. I'd. at 162.
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notion of the idea(s) of the works. The perceiver engages in recon-
structive doing, which involves imagination and conceptual under-
standing. 69 Perception cannot exist without conception. 70
[T]here is no innocent eye. The eye comes always ancient to its
work, obsessed by its own past and by old and new insinuations of
the ear, nose, tongue, fingers, heart, and brain. . . . It selects,
rejects, organizes, discriminates, associates, classifies, analyzes,
constructs. It does not so much mirror as take and make; and
what it takes and makes it sees not bare, as items without attrib-
utes, but as things, as food, as people, as enemies, as stars, as weap-
ons. Nothing is seen nakedly or naked. 7
There is no single correct way in which to perceive something.
Any object can be seen in many ways.
[T]he object before me is a man, a swarm of atoms, a complex of
cells, a fiddler, a friend, a fool, and much more. If none of these
constitute the object as it is, what else might? If all are ways the
object is, then none is the way the object is. I cannot copy all these
at once. '
7 2
The ideas left unprotected by copyright are not the invisible ideas of
the author given visible expression in a work. Rather, they are the
ideas found in the work by its multiple perceivers. They are reduc-
tions from the work, a lessening of its complexity, not its essence. The
work is reduced from its totality, what the author put down on paper,
or in marble, into the perceiver's idea of the author's idea. Each
abstraction is one step further removed from the author's creation.
169. DEWEY, supra note 162, at 51.
170. See supra note 136 and accompanying text; see also DEWEY, supra note 162, at 54
("For to perceive [as opposed to simply sense], a beholder must create his own experience....
The artist selected, simplified, clarified, abridged and condensed according to his interest. The
beholder must go through these operations according to his point of view and interest.").
171. GOODMAN, supra note 25, at 7-8; see JOSEPH Z. MARGOLIS, The Nature of Aesthetic
Interests, in PHILOSOPHY LOOKS AT THE ARTS, supra note 45, at 1, 4 ("The perception of
physiognomic aspects of the lines in a painting, discrimination of the 'movement' of a musical
line, the appreciation of scenes depicted in novels or of the motivation of characters in a play
all suggest our reliance on abilities that may inform sensory perception but that cannot be
characterized merely as such.").
172. GOODMAN, supra note 25, at 6-7. The great Mexican muralist, J.C. Orozco said
In every painting, as in any other work of art, there is always an IDEA, never a
STORY. The idea is the point of departure, the first cause of the plastic
construction, and it is present all the time as energy creating matter. The stories
and other literary associations exist only in the mind of the spectator, the
painting acting as the stimulus.
There are as many literary associations as spectators. One of them, when
looking at a picture representing a scene of war, for example, may start thinking
of murder, another of pacifism, another of anatomy, another of history, and so
on.
JOSE C. OROZCO, THE ORozco FRESCOES AT DARTMOUTH (Albert I. Dickerson ed., 1934).
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V. SYMPTOMS OF UNPROTECTED IDEAS
No definition will suffice to separate unprotectible idea from pro-
tectible expression. Nor is it possible to set out a set of simple, precise
criteria that will inevitably accompany the presence of an unpro-
tectible idea. But we need a means of distinction, to avoid masking
conclusions behind overly vague, contentless labels.
Ideas that exist within the human mind, abstractions from the
literal creations of an author, are found on both sides of what is called
the idea/expression dichotomy. Meaning/content/semantics are pro-
tected at their more complex levels. It is not, therefore, accurate to
say that ideas are unprotected, at least given the most likely meanings
of the word. Some ideas are not protected; others are. Unless copy-
right forbids only literal copying, or goes to the opposite extreme of
forbidding any use of previous works, we need a means to determine
which takings are forbidden by copyright.
The basic principle underlying copyright is that providing pro-
tection for creative works will promote creation and investment in
creation. That determination has already been made, but only in a
general sense. The distinction between idea and expression can be
used to encourage creation in a more subtle way. "Ideas," meaning
unprotected ideas, are left free for others to use, thus avoiding the
grant of overbroad rights that would unduly inhibit the independent
creations of others.173 Granting an author the exclusive rights to any
possibl.e derivation from his work would curtail the ability of new
authors to pursue their own works.174 It would make the creation of
new works more costly without adding sufficient countervailing incen-
tives f:3r the creation of the earlier work.
We need to distinguish between that which should belong to an
author and the raw materials that must be left free for others' use.
There are three symptoms that tend to be present when elements of an
author's work are properly considered unprotected ideas. These
symptoms are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for the exist-
173. See Gund, Inc. v. Smile Int'l, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 642 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); see also
POSNER, supra note 12, at 348 ("The more extensive copyright protection is, the more
inhibited is the literary imagination."); Chafee, supra note 36, at 514 ("Even the first user of a
plot or a human situation should not have a monopoly of it. The public should have the
opportunity to see what others can do with it. At the point where the use of material is too
close to give the public anything new, the ideal of encouraging independent creation ceases to
operate,").
174. See KAPLAN, supra note 26, at 2 ("[I]f man has any 'natural rights,' not the least must
be a right to imitate his fellows, and thus to reap where he has not sown. Education, after all,
proceeds from a kind of mimicry, and 'progress', if it is not entirely an illusion, depends on
generous indulgence of copying.").
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ence of an unprotectible idea, but tend in conjunction with other such
symptoms to be present. 17 They may overlap to some extent, but
each protects the public domain from too large a removal.
A. Simple v. Complex
Simple ideas are like primary colors or elements of matter. They
exist in limited number. Protection inheres in the mixture or arrange-
ment of these elements, the place where they come together. 176 As
sentences are built out of words, thoughts are built of ideas. An idea
is an atom of meaning. 177 The similarity between the plaintiff's and
defendant's works is more or less saturated with detail. The greater
that saturation, the more appropriate a finding of infringement.
The objective is to protect ingredients, as ingredients, against
monopolization. ' 78 The simplest ideas are uncompounded, not distin-
guishable into different ideas.' 79  A combination of several simple
ideas can build a more complex idea.' 80 Even if individual elements of
a plot or fictional character are unprotectible ideas, their combination
may be subject to protection.'
8 1
Granting exclusive rights to a basic, single, simple idea removes
something of size from the public domain. If an author obtains exclu-
175. I have borrowed the notion of symptoms of an idea from Goodman's symptoms of the
aesthetic. See GOODMAN, supra note 25, at 252.
176. Lewys v. O'Neill, 49 F.2d 603, 607 ("Ideas ... are free as air." However, mixtures
may not be; there are few primary colors, but many mixtures.). See Runstadler Studios, Inc. v.
MCM Ltd. Partnership, 768 F. Supp. 1292, 1295 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (combinations of standard
shapes may possess the requisite creativity necessary for copyright protection).
177. BENNETT, supra note 157, at 2.
178. See Stevenson v. Harris, 238 F. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (Originality lies in the association
and grouping of incidents; similar incidents used in different ways should not infringe.); see
also Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933); Simonton v. Gordon, 297 F.
625 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); cf. Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86 (1898) (Words are "as little
susceptible of private appropriation as air or sunlight." The right is to arrangement of words
which the author has selected to express ideas.).
179. LOCKE, supra note 123, at 61-62; see DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN
NATURE 50 (Ernest C. Mossner ed., Penguin Books 1984) (1739) ("Simple... ideas are such
as admit of no distinction nor separation. The complex are the contrary to these, and may be
distinguished into parts.").
180. See LOCKE, supra note 123, at 96.
181. In Frankel v. Irwin, 34 F.2d 142, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1918), the court held that incidents
cannot be literary property, but piracy may consist in taking such incidents in combination.
See Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 243 (2d Cir. 1983) ("A
character is an aggregation of the particular talents and traits his creator selected for him.
That each one may be an idea does not diminish the expressive aspect of the combination.");
Barrs/Fraser Enters. v. Goodson-Todman Enters., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1887 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) ("[E]ven though a television game show is made up entirely of stock devices, an original
selection, organization, and presentation of such devises can nevertheless be protected, just as
it is the original combination of words .... ").
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sive rights to a more complex idea, far less is denied to later authors.
A complex idea, which combines a number of simple ideas, takes
from the public domain only the small area in which the simple ideas
intersect, and only when this intersection is ordered in a particular
way. This can be visualized as a series of ovals, each representing a
simple idea, that overlap only over a small area. The complex idea
may contain all that is within these ovals, but it is only the tiny area in
which they overlap that is protected against copying.
Protecting an author's particular way of combining constituents
will notl significantly hinder the ability of new authors to make use of
what exists in the culture. Nor will it increase unduly the costs of
creation. This is not true if constituents themselves or, probably, very
simple combinations receive exclusive rights. Such rights would
inhibit creation and increase transaction costs for those who do cre-
ate.' 8 2 Conversely, allowing others to use these simple constituents
does little to discourage creation of the earlier works that embody
them. Allowing such appropriations in the regular course would not
excessively diminish the market for the works of earlier authors. '18 3
These authors may reap their economic reward through the right to
prevent copying of their literal expression and of abstractions from
their works at more complex levels.
Simple ideas can be seen as part of a public commons. Locke's
labor theory of property says that in a state of nature, the individual
turns what exists in the commons into private property by the labor
exerted upon it.' 4 This appropriation would not prejudice anyone
else because there was still "enough and as good" left for others.' 85
The problem with allowing an author exclusive rights to simple ideas,
even though these rights exist only against those who have been
exposed to that author's work, is that "enough and as good" would
not remain available to others.' 86 When an author seeks to avail her-
self of an early creator's work, not merely to benefit from another's
182. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
183. See Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1541 (7th Cir. 1990).
184. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, 19-20 (Thomas P. Peardon
ed., The Liberal Arts Press, Inc. 1952) (1690).
185. Id. at 20 ("Nobody could think himself injured by the drinking of another man,
though he took a good draught, who had a whole river of the same water left him to quench
his thirit."); see Hughes, supra note 145, at 297.
186. See Hughes, supra note 145, at 297. Hughes says that "the enough and as good
condition is an equal opportunity provision leading to a desert-based, but noncompetitive
allocation of goods: each person can get as much as he is willing to work for without creating
meritocratic competition against others." See also Wendy J. Gordon, Realilty as Artifact:
From Feist to Fair Use, 55 J. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 102-04 (1992) (discussing an equality-
based entitlement to depict reality).
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pains, 187 but to add to it and create something of her own through her
own pains, forbidding that use will give her fewer options than her
predecessors. Later authors will be deprived of the ability to use the
raw materials of creation on equal terms. A new author, exposed to
an earlier author's works, should not be forced into unnatural contor-
tions in order to design around the simple ideas, the basic building
blocks of creation, contained within it.'88
Furthermore, the meaning and structure of complex ideas are
built out of simple ideas.8 9 Simple ideas tend to be derived from
experience and impressions-from the direct impact of that which
exists in the world surrounding the author. More complex ideas are
more the creation of the author, who can take simple ideas and
"repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety,
and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas.' ' 90 The human
mind "has great power in varying and multiplying the objects of its
thoughts infinitely, beyond what sensation or reflection furnishes it
with; ... it can ... put together those ideas it has, and make new
complex ones, which it never received so united."' 9' Taking simple
ideas from an earlier author's work takes less of its essential nature
than taking more complex ones. Any nonliteral appropriation from a
work involves an association or pairing of elements from that work
with other things. Where simple ingredients are taken, this pairing is
far more likely to change core features of the earlier work.
B. General v. Specific
General ideas tend to be indiscriminate and incomplete, rather
than entire and delineated. Locke said that the mind, having received
an idea, abstracts it, then puts a name to it.' 92 When children realize
that there are other things in the world that in some ways resemble
their father and mother,
they frame an idea, which they find those many particulars do par-
take in; and to that they give, with others, the name man for exam-
ple. And thus they come to have a general name, and a general
idea. Wherein they make nothing new, but only leave out of the
complex idea they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, that
which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them
187. LOCKE, supra note 184, at 20-21.
188. Cf. Kurtz, supra note 60, at 94.
189. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
190. LOCKE, supra note 123, at 62-64.
191. Id. at 96-97.
192. Id. at 277.
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all. 193
This idea can be advanced (or reduced) still further to the more
general one of animal, "which new idea is made, not by any new addi-
tion, but only, as before, by leaving out the shape, and some other
properties signified by the name man, and retaining only a body, with
life, sense, and spontaneous motion."' 9 4 General ideas are abstract
and partial ideas of more complex ones. The idea of "horse" leaves
out those particulars in which individual horses differ and retains only
those wherein they agree.' The idea of a bird on a tree ignores those
specifics in which individual birds and trees differ, and retains only
those in which they agree. The idea of feuding families whose chil-
dren marry and produce grandchildren similarly retains only the few
specificii in which such families agree. Below a certain level of speci-
ficity, meaning (semantics) should be considered unprotected idea.' 19
If the use of general ideas is forbidden, more will be denied to
others than is denied by a prohibition against using more specific
ideas. Any bird on any tree encompasses far more than a specific bird
on a specific tree, although even the latter is probably too general to
be protected. Nor is it necessary to protect the more general ideas
derived from a work in order to provide an incentive to create. An
author remains able to prevent others from copying her more specific
elaborations of these ideas, and this ability provides a substantial
incentive.
Authors do not create in a vacuum, using only the contents of
their own minds. Their ideas do not spring full grown, like Athena
from the head of Zeus. "Worldmaking as we know it always starts
from worlds already on hand; the making is a remaking."' 97 Authors
create from what they know, from what they have seen, heard, read,
felt, and experienced within the context of their cultures, including
193. Id. at 296.
194. id.
195. Id. at 296-97. According to the Cartesians, "to have an abstract idea is to think of
some feature or features of the perceptible without attending to other features which it has
.... " 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 115, at 120.
196. A number of cases have discussed protecting particularities, but not generalities. See,
e.g., WELker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1986); Mattel v. Azrak-
Hamway Int'l, Inc., 724 F.2d 357, 360 (2d Cir. 1983); Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips
Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 617 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 889 (1982);
Warner Bros. Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 654 F.2d 204, 208-09 (2d Cir. 1981);
Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
980 (1976); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
298 U.S. 669 (1936); Davis v. United Artists, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 722, 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Miller Brewing Co. v. Carling O'Keefe Breweries, 452 F. Supp. 429, 439 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
197. GOODMAN, supra note 24, at 6.
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the works of other authors. 19 This is the commons from which all
may draw. 199 "The literary imagination is not a volcano of pure inspi-
ration but a weaving of the author's experience of life into an existing
literary tradition. '
'200
Ideas that are general and abstract represent an accumulation of
thought, the long history and development of language and perspec-
tive. They are, at least to some extent, part of what is provided to an
author by the environment in which she operates. They reflect human
nature, the human condition, the nature of the society and the culture
in which we live. They involve concepts, situations, and ways of see-
ing the world that experience suggests. "We look upon art as a focus
of lived experiences, given order and form by our normal imaginative
processes. Artistic particularity arises from the manner in which the
order and form are made concrete and offered to perception."'2 1'
The deeper structures of a work, its most general ideas, belong
the least to its author. It is the more specific ideas, which may be
termed expression, that tend to embody an author's individual depar-
ture and most genuine creation. Seeing in the mind's eye or hearing
in the mind's ear is different from the sensory state of actual percep-
tion.2"2 Any idea derived from a work, however general or specific, is
at least one step removed from the work itself. As an idea becomes
more and more general or abstract, it becomes further removed from
the work itself, from that which the author provides.
As with simple ideas, general ideas should be left free for use in
order to prevent the removal of basic building blocks from the public
domain, to avoid depleting the stock of raw materials available for use
by others. General ideas are building blocks because they are part of
human experience and our notions of the world. No author, by devel-
oping a general idea, should be granted the ability to prevent others
exposed to his work from making use of it. This is true, even when it
is original to the author, in the sense that the author has not copied it,
and it is new to him.20 3
There is an additional, practical reason for refusing protection to
198. Cf. Gordon, supra note 186, at 99 ("When an artist sends an artifact into the world, it
affects other people and becomes part of their reality. To depict their reality accurately, and
deal with the power others' images would otherwise have over them, audiences may need to
reproduce artifacts in which copyright subsists.").
199. Chafee, supra note 36, at 514.
200. POSNER, supra note 12, at 348.
201. Eco, supra note 122, at 109.
202. BENNETr, supra note 157, at 39.
203. "Copyright only protects original works of authorship. The standard for originality is
low, however. A work need not be novel, highly creative or aesthetically appealing.
Originality merely requires that the work owe its origin to its author-that it be independently
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more general ideas. It is difficult to determine whether a defendant
has copied such an idea from the plaintiff or originated it indepen-
dently. As Professor Litman has noted, even the most creative works
are likely to "include some elements adapted from raw material that
the author first encountered in someone else's works." 2" Indeed,
because copying can be subconscious, a defendant may be unaware of
whether he has copied.205 The things an author has experienced, seen,
heard, Felt and thought are not separated, within her mind, into neat
boxes labelled "things I am copying" and "things I thought up.''2°6
Given the nature of this process, providing protection for more gen-
eral ideas would have a particularly pernicious affect on the creative
process. The fact that it is difficult to determine the source of such
ideas exacerbates the risk of denying basic building blocks to new
authors.
C. Standard Quality
There are ways in which we are used to looking at things. The
standard way of doing things is the usual, obvious, normal, ordinary,
"natural" way. Goodman has said that the realism of representation
in art depends not on how closely the object is duplicated in a work of
art, but on the system of representation that is standard for a given
culture.20 7 What we call literal representation, even in visual works,
depends upon convention and assumes a commonly acceptable frame-
work. For pictures that are seen as realistic, the key to viewing them
is readily at hand-"by virtually automatic habit; practice has ren-
dered the symbols so transparent that we are not aware of any effort,
of any alternatives, or of making any interpretation at all. '20 8 Other
created and not copied from other works." Kurtz, supra note 60, at 96; see 1 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 55, § 2.01[a].
204. See Litman, supra note 9, at 1011.
205. Id. at 1010 ("[T]ransformation is the essence of the authorship process. Some of this
transfoimation is purposeful; some of it is inadvertent; much of it is the product of an author's
peculiar astigmatic vision.").
206. Id. at 1010 (An author's views of the world "are shaped by her experiences, by the
other works of authorship she has absorbed (which are also her experiences), and by the
interaclion between the two. Her brain has not organized all of this into neat, separable piles
entitled 'things that happened to me,' 'things I read once,' and 'things I thought up in a
vacuum' to enable her to draw the elements of her works of authorship from the correct pile.
She did not, after all, experience them so discretely.").
207. GOODMAN, supra note 25, at 37-38.
208. Id. at 36. What we see as realistic may change over time. "What counts as emphasis,
of course, is departure from the relative prominence accorded the several features in the
current world of our everyday seeing. With changing interests and new insights, the visual
weighting of features of bulk or line or stance or light alters, and yesterday's level world seems
strangely perverted-yesterday's realistic calendar landscape becomes a repulsive caricature."
Id. at 11. Specific conventions imposed on certain kinds of works may also be important. For
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works of art, however, require "discover[ing] rules of interpretation
and apply[ing] them deliberately. ' ' 209 The realism of the picture
depends on the standard quality of the system of representation
employed by the artist.
If representation is a matter of choice and correctness a matter of
information, realism is a matter of habit.... That a picture looks
like nature often means only that it looks the way nature is usually
painted.210
A painting of a person does not really look like a person. It looks
like a flat surface covered with paint. Nobody will confuse a piece of
canvas with a flesh and blood human being.21' Yet, a viewer might
term the portrait "realistic." Properties that are standard "are ordi-
narily irrelevant to what we take it to look like or resemble in the
relevant sense, and hence to what we take it to depict or represent.
'212
For example, a marble bust of a Roman emperor will seem to resem-
ble a man with an aquiline nose, wrinkled brow, and an expression of
grim determination, not a perpetually motionless man of marble
color, who is severed at the chest. These last qualities are standard
and therefor irrelevant to what we interpret the statue to represent.213
In a painting, flatness and a painted look are standard; colors and
shapes are what are taken as relevant in determining what, if any-
thing, the work represents.
We tend to overlook the familiar or standard. A drawing by
Katharine Sturgis shows a hockey player in motion by using a single
charged line. 214 "[W]e find what we are prepared to find (what we
look for or what forcefully affronts our expectations), and ... we are
likely to be blind to what neither helps nor hinders our pur-
suits. .... 215 Nor is this blindness limited to the visual arts. Wittgen-
stein said: "The aspects of things that are most important for us are
hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity (One is unable to
notice something because it is always before one's eyes). The real
example, conventions in ornithological art require minute attention to detail of plumage and
other physical characteristics of a bird. Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exch.,
575 F.2d 62, 66 (3d Cir. 1978).
209. GOODMAN, supra note 25, at 36.
210. Id. at 38-39. In dealing with the visual arts, writers have differed on whether there are
favored resemblances to which the human eye is prone, for example whether linear perspective
is natural or conventional. See Joseph Z. Margolis, Representation in Art, in PHILOSOPHY
LOOKS AT THE ARTS, supra note 45, at 279.
211. See Kendall L. Walton, Categories ofArt, in PHILOSOPHY LOOKS AT THE ARTS, supra
note 45, at 53, 60.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. GOODMAN, supra note 24, at 14.
215. Id.
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foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all."'2 16
Standard conventional perspectives are more likely to be consid-
ered idea than those that depart from convention. 217 These perspec-
tives are the most common, ordinary, or usual. They arise from the
way we look at the world and provide the perceiver with a readily
acceptable framework that is ignored because of its familiarity. 28
They are not owned and no good reason exists to protect them except
against a nearly literal form of copying. A less readily comprehensi-
ble way of looking at the world that moves away from these unspoken
assumptions is more likely to be considered expression. If an author's
way of looking at things deviates from the standard, if she chooses an
unusual, nonobvious, abnormal, extraordinary, unnatural way to
express her ideas, she can expect to be protected against a wider array
of imitators and more abstract forms of copying.
VI. CONCLUSION
The evil of the idea idea is that its use.., engenders an illusion of
having explained something. And the illusion is increased by the
fact that things wind up in a vague enough state to insure a certain
stability, or freedom from further progress.219
The topics dealt with in this article do not lend themselves to
neat conclusions. Copyrights approach what "may be called the met-
aphysics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be, very
subtile and refined, and, sometimes, almost evanescent. ' 220 Nowhere
is this more true than in the distinction between idea and expression.
We may hunt the raccoon, and learn about the territory explored, but
we cannot trap it.
216. 'Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein, quoted in OLIVER W. SACKS, THE MAN WHO
MISTOOK HIS WIFE FOR A HAT 43 (Perennial Library Edition 1987).
217. The court in Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exch., 575 F.2d 62, 65 (3d
Cir. 197f;) recognized a variation on this theme. The court did not focus on what makes a
picture kok realistic, but did state that an artist who produces a particularly "realistic" picture
"may be hard pressed to prove unlawful copying by another who uses the same subject matter
and the same technique." In the impressionist's work, however, "the lay observer will be able
to differentiate more readily between the reality of subject matter and subjective effect of the
artist's work."
218. One reason courts have had so much difficulty in determining the scope of protection
appropriate for computer programs is that there are no clearly accepted conventions. See
supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text. In dealing with literature, motion pictures,
television, music, and the visual arts, judges are working from sets of reasonably well
understcod and shared perceptions-perceptions that remain unexplained because they are
well understood. In dealing with computer programs, they do not have the benefit of a readily
available framework and seem to be trying to reason out an appropriate set of conventions-a
difficult task.
219. 'ILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 48 (2d ed. 1964).
220. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
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In seeking to sort what copyright calls idea from what it calls
expression, it is important to remember the principles that make the
distinction significant. Not all borrowings from the work of another
are forbidden, nor should they be. When protection against a form of
copying interferes too much with the ability of others to create their
own works, clogging the channels of creativity and commerce, that
protection should not be provided. Properly used, the idea/expres-
sion distinction makes the basic building blocks of creation available
to authors who have encountered them in another work. It protects
the most individualized contributions of the author rather than what
the author draws from society, language and artistic convention.
